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Least restrictive alternative - advance statements and
the new mental health legislation
Proposals for new mental health legislation make the case
for using the ‘least restrictive alternative’ (Scottish
Executive, 2001) and the ‘least restrictive environment’
(Department of Health & Home Office, 2000) as guiding
principles in deciding the management and treatment of
the patient. This appears to be the case made for intro-
ducing compulsory treatment in the community. The
patient living in the community, while maintained on
medication, rather than the hospital would appear to be
defined as on the ‘least restrictive alternative’. This,
however, takes only a limited approach to what is
‘restrictive’, which should be interpreted more widely,
including the patient’s view as well as that of clinicians
and policy makers. Thus, a patient may see it as less
restrictive during an acute phase to be in hospital and not
on medication, than in the community but on medication.
It is likely, given our knowledge of patients’attitudes to
medication (Eastwood & Pugh,1997), that many patients
will prefer to be on oral medication rather than depot,
which they see as less restrictive.
If the least restrictive alternative is to be a formative
principle in providing ongoing care under new mental
health legislation, then consideration has to be given as
to how it is to be incorporated. There appears to be no
intention to enshrine a hierarchy of restrictiveness in
legislation, although this has happened in some American
states; in Michigan seclusion is considered less restrictive
than physical restraint, which is less restrictive than
enforced medication (Slovenko, 1989). The pro forma for
making an advance directive, offered by the American
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (see http//
www.bazelon.org/adudir.html), invites people to select
their personal hierarchy of these same options. This needs
to be seen in the context of the individual’s right in some
American states to refuse medication in certain circum-
stances, even when detained (Atkinson & Patterson,
2001).
Guidelines might, however, be given in any Code of
Practice that accompanies the new Acts and could indi-
cate whether the least restrictive alternative is an indivi-
dual or policy formulation. Although it is unlikely that
many practitioners or patients in the UK would share the
hierarchy of restraint formalised in Michigan, it does
highlight the subjective dimension of ‘restrictive’.
A formulation of the least restrictive alternative for a
particular patient requires knowledge of that patient’s
individual perspective. The time of detention may not be
most appropriate to determine this, given that both the
patient’s mental state and the detention itself may be
experienced as coercive, restrictive and forcing the
patient into choices he/she did not want to make in the
first place. This may be particularly true if in-patient
treatment issues are to be included in the ‘least
restrictive’, as well as treatment plans devised at the time
of discharge. If detained patients are not to be able to
refuse medication then any commitment to the least
restrictive alternative on an individual rather than policy
level is already limited.
Ideally, patients’ views would be known before
detention and since advance statements/agreements are
being proposed in the new legislation (Scottish Executive,
2001; Department of Health & Home Office, 2000), it
may prove useful to see these two proposals in combi-
nation. Thus, the concept of restrictive practice could be
discussed with patients in a context away from the actual
detention, written into an advance statement and incor-
porated into management plans from the outset. Clearly
this will only apply to patients already in contact with
psychiatric services. This, no doubt, already happens in
many consultations when agreeing a treatment or
management plan with a patient, even if not couched in
these terms. In the same way, it is likely that wishes
expressed in advance statements might be reinterpreted
as the least restrictive alternative. Indeed, it could be
argued that if a patient makes an advance statement, by
definition, this has to be ‘least restrictive’ because it is
what the patient has chosen.
As well as considering the length and location of
confinement, Gostin (2000) argues that the Human
Rights Act requires determination of what constitutes
detention to consider ‘the use of force or deception, the
person’s resistance to or displeasure with, restraint and
treatment [and] the person’s mental capacity’. Challenge
under the Human Rights Act to the use of restrictions,
including in the community, may rest on the issue of
proportionality.
Although the use of advance statements/agree-
ments will be influenced by ethics, resources (Halpern &
Szmukler, 1997) and legal implications (Dawson et al,
2001), there does appear, however, to be a growing
commitment to them, as evidenced by the mental health
law reviews in the UK. A recent New York State initiative,
which is spending US$1million on an education campaign
advising how to complete a mental health advance
directive (Monahan et al, 2001), demonstrates a commit-
ment to them in a country from which, for better or
worse, many social policy initiatives are imported into the
UK.
It is probably a mistake to assume that the least
restrictive alternative will be a static concept for patients
and it should be expected that it might change as a
patient experiences different forms of management and
control. As with advance statements, patients’ choices
are influenced by what they have experienced. Patients
may find a choice more restrictive or upsetting than
expected; for example, if refusing medication were to
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lead to physical restraint. Staying in the community may
bring unexpected restrictions. Some of the conditions
placed on patients on a community care order are highly
restrictive, to the point where institutional living may give
more day-to-day freedom (Atkinson et al, 2002).
Community care orders were introduced in Scotland in
the Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995.
Following the restriction of leave of absence to 12
months, it allowed conditions to be put on patients living
in the community, but did not allow enforced medication.
The committee set up to review the 1984 Mental Health
Act in Scotland, under the chairmanship of the former
Secretary of State for Scotland, Rt Hon. Bruce Millan
(Scottish Executive, 2001), recommended the abolition of
the community care order in favour of a community order,
thus replacing a less restrictive order with a potentially
more restrictive one.
As with advance statements, we might expect that
resources will have an influence on least restrictive
choice. Refusing medication may result in increased
hospital stay, as described in relation to advance direc-
tives (Halpern & Szmukler, 1997). How far, however, is it
appropriate to impose restrictive choices on a patient
because of lack of resources or political inability to deliver
choices? The Mental Health Acts already state that
patients should be detained at the minimum level of
security necessary. Nevertheless, there is a substantial
number of patients detained in the State Hospital at
Carstairs whom everyone agrees does not require
maximum security, yet there is nowhere to which these
patients can be discharged (Mental Welfare Commission
for Scotland, 1999). Despite Scottish Parliament plans to
develop medium secure units, local politicians in Scotland
have supported local objections to having such units
within their constituencies. Lack of a less restrictive
facility would almost certainly not lead to someone being
fully discharged from a more restrictive one (R. v.
Camden and Islington Health Authority ex parte K, 2001)
but still requires consideration as a breach of the princi-
ples enshrined in the new legislation.
Lack of resources to implement one of the principles
suggested for the new Scottish Act would run counter to
another of the recommended fundamental principles,
namely reciprocity, which balances taking away a person’s
freedom with the provision of good care. Concern has
been expressed, however, that if the ‘best’ care is
provided for patients who are detained then this provides
a perverse incentive to detain people who might other-
wise have been treated as voluntary patients. This, of
course, would then be in direct contradiction to the
principle of a least restrictive alternative. One of the
fundamental principles articulated by the Millan
Committee (Scottish Executive, 2001) as underpinning
the new Act is patient autonomy and it is here that least
restrictive alternative and advance statements could be
envisaged as coming together to support this principle.
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